Reports
Executive summary
This Global edition of the Executive Summary is intended solely as a convenience for the non-Japanese-reading global audience, and includes selected elements from the entire Japanese report. Also we have added additional charts (map of Japan, etc.) to make it easier for the global audience to understand. If any questions arise related to the accuracy of the information contained in the translation, please refer to the Japanese-language version of the Commission Report, which is the official version of the document. If there are any discrepancies or differences between the Japanese-language version and this Global edition, the Japanese-language version shall prevail.
Executive summary | pdf 10MB* (high res) pdf 2.4MB* (Low res) |
1st Half html 2nd Half html |
*Updated on September 12, 2012
Appendices | ||
Survey of the evacuees | pdf 1MB | |
Survey of the workers | pdf 0.8MB | |
Commission meeting reports | pdf 0.3MB | |
Glossary of terms | pdf 0.6MB |
Main report
This English translation of the report is a direct translation of the main report. If any questions arise related to the accuracy of the information contained in the translation, please refer to the Japanese-language version of the Commission Report, which is the official version of the document. If there are any discrepancies or differences between the Japanese-language version and this English translation, the Japanese -language version shall prevail.
The Reference Materials and The Transcript of the Commission Meetings are available only in Japanese.
Main report | ||
Introduction | ||
Letter to the President and Speaker of both Houses | ||
Preface from the Chairman | ||
Overview of the Investigation | ||
Conclusions and recommendations | ||
Preface | ||
1. Was the accident preventable? | ||
1.1 Essential lack of robustness against earthquakes | ||
1.2 Tsunami risk recognized but lacked countermeasures |
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1.3 Severe accident countermeasures disregarded international standards |
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2. Escalation of the accident | ||
2.1 How the accident developed and an overall review | ||
2.2 Analyses and discussions on some issues | ||
3. Problems with the nuclear emergency response | ||
3.1 Problems with TEPCO’s response | ||
3.2 Problems with the government’s response to the nuclear accident | ||
3.3 Problems with the emergency response led by the Kantei |
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3.4 Evaluation of the emergency response by the Kantei and the government bureaucratic organizations |
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3.5 Problems with Fukushima Prefecture’s emergency response | ||
3.6 Problems with the government’s information disclosure during emergencies |
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4. Overview of the damage and how it spread | ||
4.1 Overview of damage from the nuclear power plant accident |
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4.2 Problems with evacuation orders from the residents’ perspective |
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4.3 Flaws in the government’s nuclear emergency preparedness |
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4.4 The health effects of radiation: current and future prospects | ||
4.5 Environmental contamination and prolonged decontamination issues | ||
5. Organizational issues of the parties involved in the accident | ||
5.1 Background to the causes of the accident | ||
5.2 The regulatory authorities became “captives” of TEPCO and the FEPC | ||
5.3 Institutional issues at TEPCO | ||
5.4 Organizational issues concerning regulatory bodies | ||
6. Necessary measures to improve the legal system | ||
6.1 Need for fundamental reform of nuclear laws and regulations |
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Appendix 1 Glossary of terms | ||
Appendix 2 Items that should continue to be monitored by the Diet | ||
Appendix 3 Commission meeting reports |