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# Global Norms: Creation, Diffusion, and Limits

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# Global Norms: Creation, Diffusion, and Limits

Johanna Martinsson

Norms in development are typically established at the global level to solve complex development challenges on the ground. These norms are standards of expected behavior about how things ought to be conducted and are deemed crucial for societies to flourish. Global norms, however, often fail to successfully diffuse to local contexts. I intend to argue in this report that many initiatives are effective in putting norms on the global agenda, but few of these norms lead to transformational change on the ground because of cultural and political economy challenges that were not considered in the norm formation or in the advocacy campaign process. Nonetheless, there are lessons to consider that could lead to more successful outcomes.

This report explores the journey of norms in development—from emergence to implementation. Specifically, it seeks to identify effective strategies for norms to take root and make part of the global and domestic agendas and limits. It also identifies challenges to the implementation of norms and some possible strategies and tools to overcome these challenges. The report draws from various global policy advocacy campaigns with a particular focus on governance; it also includes notable historic campaigns, such as Britain’s antislavery campaign.

## The Emergence of Norms for Global Advocacy

*Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, that is the only thing that ever has. – Margaret Mead (1901–78)*

Social change has always started with a person (or a small group of committed people) who shares a common belief about an issue she or he wants to pursue to affect normative change. Such individuals, or “norm entrepreneurs,” play a critical role in the three stages of Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) “norm life cycle”: *norm emergence*, *norm cascade*, and *internalization*. Those authors point out that, at each stage, change is “characterized by different actors, motives, and mechanisms of influence” (p. 895). In the campaign process, norm entrepreneurs specifically “identify a problem, specify a cause, and propose a solution, all with an eye toward producing procedural, substantive, and normative change in their area of concern” (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 8). Persuasion is at the heart of this process, as the aim is to persuade leaders and build public support about a particular norm. To this effect, common advocacy tools include (1) using media, (2) lobbying, (3) mobilizing grassroots, (4) building coalitions,

and (5) using the legal system (Accenture Foundation 2009). These tools have been used for hundreds of years, dating back to historic campaigns such as Britain’s antislavery campaign and the women’s suffrage movement that inspired many subsequent campaigns (including the antiapartheid campaign in South Africa and the civil rights movement in the United States).

Thomas Clarkson was the main figure and norm entrepreneur behind Britain’s antislavery campaign, the most successful reform movement in the 19th century. The norms on the abolishment of slavery emerged when Clarkson learned the horrific facts about slave trade while conducting research at Cambridge University for an essay contest titled “Is It Lawful to Make Slaves of Others against Their Will?” (*Economist* 2007). To form a nationwide antislavery movement and change norms about the slave trade, Clarkson gathered evidence and traveled throughout the country to promote the cause and to form coalitions that resulted in two national petition campaigns. (Oldfield 2009)

It is interesting that norms about women’s rights emerged with women’s involvement in the antislavery movement in the United Kingdom and, in the United States, when women were refused seats at the World Anti-Slavery Conference in 1840. The resentment motivated two women, Lucretia Mott and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, to start an international movement. They organized the very first convention in 1848, composed the Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments (modeled after the Declaration of Independence), and demanded the same rights possessed by men—including the right to vote. The campaign was effective in connecting norms on women’s rights to the basic values of a democratic state. (Keck and Sikkink 1998)

The wave of global changes in the 1990s, including technological advancements and a growing international civil society, contributed to a rapid increase and diversity of norms to tackle global challenges through more sophisticated strategies and tactics. A noteworthy example is the Interna-

tional Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL “About Us” n.d.). Spearheaded by Jody Williams, a teacher and aid worker, the campaign was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize in 1997 for its efforts to ban landmines. The campaign later led to the signing of the Mine Ban Treaty. Transparency International (TI) is another example of a one-person idea that evolved into a global campaign. Throughout his career in international development, TI founder Peter Eigen had witnessed firsthand the effects of corruption, bribery, and embezzlement. Devoted to the cause, Eigen formed a global coalition to fight corruption in 1993 (Eigen 2003). Another example is the Global Campaign for Education, founded by four major nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in 1999, which advocates for education for all and holds governments accountable for promises made in extending education (Gaventa and Mayo 2009).

These are just a few examples of norms that emerged through a person or a small group of people—that is, norm entrepreneurs. For a norm to become internationally recognized and find a place on the global agenda, however, it must first become accepted by states.

## Global Norms and Global Agenda Setting

Global norms are defined as “the shared expectations or standards of appropriate behavior accepted by states and intergovernmental organizations that can be applied to states, intergovernmental organizations, and/or nonstate actors of various kinds” (Khagram, Rikker, and Sikkink 2002, 14). In general, global norms are created in direct response to a crisis, or new measures are built on existing norms. International organizations, professional associations, and transnational advocacy coalitions are usually leading the efforts to author, codify, and validate global norms (Khagram 2004).

This section of the report will explore four possible routes to how norms are established in the international community:

1. *Legal norm setting*—International organizations and governments form norms through conventions, declarations, treaties, and so forth.
2. *Multistakeholder initiatives*—Stakeholders from government, the private sector, international organizations, and civil society form norms through inclusive and deliberative processes.
3. *Global policy networks*—State and nonstate actors jointly bring new issues and ideas into public discourse and complement policy making and international cooperation.
4. *Transnational advocacy coalitions*—Nonstate actors advocate norms through transnational campaigns and monitor implementation.

In the literature reviewed for this report, there is a tendency to refer to some of these initiatives interchangeably, especially multistakeholder initiatives and global policy networks; I argue that there is a distinction and will clarify that in the following sections. Table 1 provides a summary of the norm-setting initiatives and how they differ.

### Legal Route

In the second stage of the norm life cycle, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) explain that “norm leaders attempt to socialize other states to become norm followers” (p. 895), and a “norm cascade” occurs when a critical mass of states has adopted a norm. As an example, they refer to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines. In early 1997, some 60 states were supporting a total ban of landmines; a norm cascade occurred later that year when some 124 states endorsed the landmines treaty.

While reasons to adopt a norm may differ, Finnemore and Sikkink argue that norm cascade is facilitated by a mixture of factors, such as “pressure for conformity, desire to enhance international legitimation, and the desire of state leaders to enhance their self-esteem” (p. 895). Depending on the issue, the authors also suggest that some states are more critical than others in adopting norms. For example, a state is considered critical if the norm it adopts directly affects it. In the landmines case, the

critical states to adopt the landmines ban were both producers and users of landmines. Also, some states were more influential than others (such as South Africa under the leadership of Nelson Mandela), and that had a significant impact on other states. Moreover, some norms resonate and diffuse more effectively than others. According to Keck and Sikkink (1998), norms that entail equality and bodily harm to “innocent groups” (such as slavery and women’s rights) have a greater impact than other types of norms.

Global norms are generally announced by states and members of the international community when signing an agreement such as a treaty, a convention, a declaration, or a communiqué. By signing a convention, states are encouraged by fellow members to enforce the norm in their respective countries. Peters, Koechlin, and Zinkernagel (2009) point out, however, that international legal norm setting does not exactly correspond to democratic ideals because many of the states participating are nondemocratic, and some states have limited bargaining power. Furthermore, it is not representative because NGOs are excluded from voting. Besides, a convention is not legally binding until it has been ratified. Thus, the validity of the international legal norm setting is more informal in nature. Signing a convention does not guarantee enforcement because domestic cultural and political economy conditions often hinder global norms from being implemented into law. On ratification, however, consequences may follow if compliance fails—consequences in the form of sanctions and other means of pressure from the international community.

There are several examples of predominant global legal frameworks focusing on changing norms on corruption.

#### *The United Nations Convention against Corruption*

The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), a global initiative enforced in 2005, aims to curb corruption through collective action. It calls for better transparency and accountability in countries through private sector

**Table 1. Global Norm-Setting Initiatives**

Attributes	Legal Route	Multistakeholder Initiatives	Global Policy Networks	Transnational Advocacy by Nonstate Actors
Founders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>International organization(s)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>International organizations(s) and government(s) coming together or individual organizations and associations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>International organizations and/or individual organizations/associations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A person, a civil society organization, or a group of civil society organizations</li> </ul>
Membership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Formal membership, including states signing an international agreement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Formal memberships, including members from governments, international organizations, the private sector, and civil society organizations</li> <li>Not necessarily experts on the subject matter</li> <li>Strict criteria and formal selection process for representatives</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Voluntary membership, open to experts in a specific policy area</li> <li>Broad membership provides a more complete picture of a particular policy issue</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Primarily nonstate actors (civil society organizations, grassroots organizations, social movements)</li> <li>Membership can be limited to civil society organizations</li> <li>May have ad hoc partnerships with other actors</li> </ul>
Purpose	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>International legal norm-setting, with the aim for states to implement new norms into law</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fill governance gaps in areas where other governance forms are insufficient</li> <li>Seek solutions to problems through an inclusive and deliberative approach</li> <li>Develop, implement, and monitor norms</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Seek to complement policy making through research, sharing of knowledge, and training</li> <li>Aim to influence policy makers and keep a policy issue on the global agenda</li> <li>Help develop, negotiate, and implement norms</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Seek to influence social change by bringing new ideas and norms into global discussion</li> <li>Promote global norms and implement them</li> <li>Pressure target actors to adopt new policies</li> </ul>
Characteristics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Nonresponsive; NGOs excluded from voting</li> <li>Issue-specific, formal, and long-term</li> <li>Process-oriented and deliberative, usually long and difficult negotiations as states are dealing with various contextual challenges</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Multisectoral initiatives among governments, the private sector, civil society organizations, and sometimes international organizations</li> <li>Issue-specific, formal, purpose-driven, short- or long-term, clear mandate and objectives, and clear governance and funding structure</li> <li>Process-oriented, inclusive, and deliberative approach to norm setting and implementation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Loose coalitions among government, international organizations, the private sector, and civil society</li> <li>Policy area-specific, clear objectives, formal or informal, funded or unfunded</li> <li>Characterized as dynamic, fluid, interdependent, and complementary</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Composed primarily of nonstate actors</li> <li>Issue-specific, clear objectives, funded, formal or informal, flexible strategies, and often informal structure</li> <li>Nonstate actors working together across borders to achieve a common goal through intense exchange of information and strategies</li> </ul>
Key functions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Advocacy, relationship-building, negotiations, dialogue, consensus building</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Dialogue and forum</li> <li>Advocacy, learning, relationship-building, communication, negotiation, consensus-building</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Advocacy, learning, collaboration, innovation, knowledge-sharing, training, and coordination</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Advocacy, persuasion, sharing of information and strategies among members</li> </ul>

Source: Author's compilation.

regulation and for inclusive participation by citizens and civil society in accountability processes. UNCAC includes a comprehensive set of standards and measures comprising norms on criminalization of corruption offenses, such as bribery and money laundering. To date, there are 140 signatories to the convention, and 146 countries are considered “parties.” The Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption was formed to strengthen cooperation between states parties and to promote and review implementation. (UNODC 2010) Furthermore, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime coordinates yearly global campaigns to raise awareness about UNCAC and corruption. TI and other international civil society organizations also play a crucial role in raising awareness and monitoring the initiative.

Nevertheless, it took several years to put corruption on the global agenda, including systematic efforts first at the technical level and later at the political level. As a result of the complexity of corruption, governments were dealing with various contextual challenges. Thus, the norm-setting process took long and difficult negotiations. (UNODC 2003) According to TI (2006), the level of ratifications to UNCAC is low because of (1) the limited endorsement by the Group of Eight countries (that TI suggests sends a negative message to other countries), (2) the broadness of the convention (that makes implementation challenging), and (3) the curious lack of governments’ awareness that they have not fully completed the ratification process.

### *The Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative*

Although not a legal framework, the StAR Initiative was established specifically to address one of UNCAC’s main issues: stolen assets. StAR, a joint initiative by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime and the World Bank, was launched in 2007 and endorsed by the Group of 20 in 2009 (APCO Worldwide 2010). It specifically “supports international efforts to end safe havens for corrupt funds” (StAR n.d.). The initiative’s main challenge,

however, has been to advance its agenda beyond a technocratic audience. Hence, the initiative has revamped its efforts to increase awareness about asset recovery and turn political will into progress in implementing financial reforms to eliminate asset thefts. Recent advocacy efforts focus on building relationships with multiple stakeholders and encouraging them to play a key role in asset recovery, leveraging high-profile events, engaging with the media, and enlisting experts as spokespeople to communicate core messages about the important role asset recovery plays in the fight against corruption. (APCO Worldwide 2010)

### *The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions*

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions is the only legal instrument in the world focusing directly on foreign bribery. Specifically, the convention “establishes legally binding standards to criminalize bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions and provides for a host of related measures that make this effective” (OECD “OECD Convention” n.d.). Since the convention was enforced in 1999, it has been adopted by 38 member- and nonmember-countries (OECD “OECD Anti-Bribery” n.d.). Each country is responsible for raising awareness of the convention and for implementing standards, monitored by an OECD working group that includes representatives from all member-states to the convention (OECD “OECD Convention” n.d.).

To raise awareness at a global level, OECD launched a three-year initiative in 2009 to (1) “raise awareness of foreign bribery as a crime,” (2) “illustrate the negative impact of foreign bribery,” and (3) “increase interest on anti-bribery measures for every country” (OECD 2011). Advocacy activities thus far include a global media campaign, a study

on the impact of foreign bribery, and collaboration with the academy on integrating the issue into course materials (OECD 2011).

### **Multistakeholder Initiatives**

Multistakeholder initiatives (MSIs) establish norms in the international community through inclusive, deliberative processes that involve a broad set of stakeholders from government, international organizations, the private sector, and civil society. The aim of these initiatives is to achieve collective solutions to problems facing stakeholders individually or as a group through a comprehensive approach (Koechlin and Calland 2009). Those authors describe MSIs as process-oriented initiatives, acting “as medium of dialogue, confidence-building, exchange and... ‘non-manipulative persuasion’ through learning, communication and argumentation across sectors, actors and interests” (p. 90). They identify five functions of MSIs: dialogue/forum, institution building, rule setting, rule implementation, and rule monitoring.

In terms of legitimacy and effectiveness, Koechlin and Calland (2009) question the main driver’s—usually a country or an international organization(s)—influence on the roles and responsibilities assigned to the different stakeholders. Because stakeholders in these initiatives come from different sectors, their status may carry different weight. Consequently, voices of all stakeholders may not be heard or considered. Moreover, since participation is voluntary, what are the motives for joining the process? The selection of representatives is a major challenge for MSIs. It includes “managing the politics of inclusion and exclusion; juggling multiple criteria for judging credible representation, such as interest position, geography, and gender; and limiting ‘constituency drift’ over time” (Dubash 2009, 234).

While critics argue that deliberative processes have little impact because legitimate representation at the global level may be impossible, Dubash points out that lack of authority and legitimacy could be seen as a strength in that “it leaves participants in

these processes free to reimagine global problems, liberated from the need to squeeze ideas into regulatory frames” (p. 235). He also suggests that “legitimacy of global deliberation often rests on credible claims to represent opinions and interest of state and nonstate actors on an ongoing basis, and on high standards of ‘epistemic-deliberative’ qualities of transparency and participatory procedures” (p. 234). In terms of negotiating new norms, Dubash emphasizes the importance of “logic of arguing,” in which norms “emerge through interaction between strategic action and shifts in perceptions and identities” (p. 223). To have an impact, however, norms established through these processes must first become socialized and widely accepted among global actors and, specifically, by states.

To illustrate how MSIs work in practice, a few examples follow.

### *The World Commission on Dams*

The World Commission on Dams (WCD) is often referred to as one of the very first MSIs. In the 1990s, the influence that international financial institutions—and particularly the World Bank—had on dams became a source of public protest (Dubash 2009). Khagram (2004) explains that forceful efforts from critics and transnational antidam networks and coalitions inspired the World Bank to reduce its involvement in large dam projects and to reform its policies and practices on issues such as resettlement, environmental assessment, indigenous people, and information disclosure. Until that point, the World Bank had failed to conduct any evaluation measures on the impact of large dam constructions. As a result, the WCD was established in 1998 to evaluate the effectiveness of all large dam projects around the world and to formulate new internationally accepted norms around the decision making “in the planning, design, construction, monitoring, operation and decommissioning of dams related to the sustainable development and management of water and energy resources” (Khagram 2004, 204).

The WCD comprised 12 commissioners representing diverse viewpoints on large dam building, in-

cluding representatives and critics from NGOs and social movements, supported by a consultative forum of some 60 stakeholders and a professional secretariat. The initiative included a two-year process of research and deliberation that incorporated public hearings, regional consultations, studies, surveys, and feedback from the general public. These activities and the composition of a diverse commission were all successful measures that led to a comprehensive framework for the decision-making process around dams. It was unanimously agreed by the commission. A core recommendation in the final report stated that people directly affected by the construction of large dams should be considered stakeholders and be included in the decision-making process around the project. (Dubash 2009)

A key factor in the success of the WCD was its ability to reframe the issue of large dam construction from a technocratic approach to that of a human rights issue by demonstrating the impact of big dams on people living in those areas. However, while the WCD had an appropriate selection process with representatives in place and internal procedures for dialogue and consensus, it became a significant challenge in practice. Full participation, for example, was limited by language barriers; and there were no mechanisms to manage public submissions. (Dubash 2009)

#### *The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative*

The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)<sup>1</sup> was launched in 2002 by then U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair as a solution to combat the lack of transparency and accountability in government revenues from the oil, gas, and mining industries (“The Latest” 2004). The term “resource curse” is often used because research has shown a strong correlation between a country’s natural resource wealth and its levels of poverty (EITI 2009c). The goal of the EITI is to reverse these trends using a set of principles agreed to at a multistakeholder workshop in 2003. The principles include two fundamental measures: (1) nations adhering to the EITI must publish payments received from the extractive industries; and (2) member-states should develop multistake-

holder initiatives between governments, the private sector, and civil society organizations to oversee the implementation and monitoring of the EITI process (EITI 2010b). The initiative also promotes a culture of transparency that involves stimulating public debate on natural resources and how revenues are spent, empowering civil society, and building trust among stakeholders. Currently, about 30 countries are intending to implement the EITI, and 11 countries have attained “compliant status” (EITI 2009b). It should be noted that more than half of those 11 countries attained this status in early 2011. To achieve compliant status, countries must go through a rigorous two-year validation process, after which they are revalidated every five years (EITI 2009c).

Koechlin and Calland (2009) address several success factors and challenges of the EITI. First of all, the initiative has been successful in setting a global standard to regulate in an area that has been weak in many countries. Partnerships formed with NGOs have played a crucial role in raising awareness and building support for the initiative. In terms of challenges, it’s been difficult reaching consensus among a diverse set of stakeholders and identifying a transparent process by which representatives are selected—specifically, the selection and/or exclusion of civil society organizations. Another concern involves the implementation of the EITI because it is driven by the international community.

#### *The International Aid Transparency Initiative*

The International Aid Transparency Initiative was launched in 2009 to bring donors, recipient countries, and civil society together in making information about aid more accessible to the public so that everyone could better understand and track how aid money is being spent. At the launch, it was declared that all donors should “publicly disclose regular, detailed and timely information on volume, allocation and, when available, results of development expenditure to enable more accurate budget, accounting and audit by developing countries”; “support information systems for managing aid”; and “provide full and timely information on annual commitments and actual disbursements” (IATI 2008).

In 2009 and 2010, the initiative has set up its governance structure and has held regional multi-stakeholder consultations. The aim has been to launch a new set of international standards in 2011, at which point the initiative will dissolve and transfer its activities to other organizations. In signing up to the transparency initiative, donors commit to participate in the process of developing new norms on aid and to implement these norms within the timetable set by members (IATI 2010).

### Global Policy Networks

Global policy networks contribute to global norm formation and agenda setting by bringing new issues into public discourse. Policy networks are defined as “loose alliances of government agencies, international organizations, corporations and elements of civil society such as NGOs, professional associations, or religious groups that join together to achieve what none can accomplish on its own” (Reinicke 1999, 44). The broad membership of policy networks allows for a wealth of information and diverse perspectives, including those from previously unheard groups. The strength of networks rests in their ability to innovate, create, share, and bridge knowledge and to seek synergies through collaboration with multiple actors (Selwood and Weyrauch 2007).

Global policy networks emerged in the early 1990s to help policy makers solve complex problems in a new and changing environment, especially with technological developments and issues cutting across multiple sectors and geographic areas (Reinicke 1999). Emerging from crises or in response to gaps in research, global policy networks assume various functions, including facilitating the negotiation of new norms on the global agenda, providing global public goods, coordinating resources for effective use, and supporting the implementation of international agreements (Benner, Reinicke, and Witte 2004).

For global networks to thrive and be sustainable, Reinicke (1999) argues that once the network is established and seen as a powerful voice in the global sphere, founding organizations should with-

draw and let other independent initiatives take over the leadership role. However, global networks with broad memberships require strong leadership. As Witte, Benner, and Reinicke (2003) point out, “networks do not offer a free lunch. They are complex political animals that require much political skill and leadership to be successful and sustainable in the long term” (p. 4). Accountability is another issue that needs to be addressed: to whom exactly are global policy networks accountable? Benner, Reinicke, and Witte (2004) point out that “networks as diffuse, complex and weakly institutionalized collaborative systems are neither directly accountable to an electoral base nor do they exhibit clear principal-agent relationships” (p. 198). They identify five types of accountability: professional accountability, public reputational accountability, market accountability, fiscal and financial accountability, and legal accountability. The authors suggest that reputational accountability is particularly important to ensure accountability in and of the networks, and “naming and shaming” is an effective strategy in this regard.

While global policy networks complement the policy-making process, they also face the issue of legitimacy. From an outside perspective, they may appear legitimate through democratic practices and leadership. However, turmoil often exists within networks if clear direction and proper procedures are lacking. Furthermore, a persistent criticism is that networks operate through a top-down approach or that Western governments and major international institutions and NGOs are dominating (Reinicke 1999). The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI), for example, has been criticized for its network approach. GAVI was established in 2002 by the World Health Organization and the World Bank, among others, “to both finance and speed the delivery of new and improved vaccines to children in the developing world” (Muraskin 2004, 1922). GAVI is a well-recognized global network that has established partnerships with all sectors. Muraskin, however, draws attention to two fundamental flaws with its network approach—flaws that he believes could have detrimental effects to GAVI

and other similar initiatives. First of all, GAVI has not been successful in striking a balance between “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches in its relationship with countries. For example, in-country groups such as NGOs were absent throughout the creation and advocacy of GAVI. As a result, global actors had no idea what was really going on in the field. Second, GAVI has not been successful in reaching “genuine consensus on the exact role that immunization should play in protecting the health of children in developing countries” (p. 1922).

For global initiatives (such as GAVI) to be sustainable, it is crucial to engage all actors in the network’s internal procedures and advocacy efforts. Doing so will strengthen legitimacy and credibility. The following are two examples of global policy networks that are effective in their respective thematic areas.

#### *The Development Assistance Committee Network on Governance*

The Development Assistance Committee Network on Governance is a policy network housed in the OECD. The network “aims to improve the effectiveness of donor assistance in support of democratic governance in developing countries” (OECD “The OECD-DAC” n.d., 1). Network members include government representatives, development practitioners, local experts, global NGOs, and policy research institutes. The Network on Governance provides a global policy forum for members to exchange knowledge and expertise, disseminate lessons learned, and develop policy tools (OECD “About the OECD-DAC” n.d.). For example, the network develops frameworks, guidelines, and policy papers; conducts studies; builds capacity; and facilitates dialogues and implementation of agreements. Outputs are used to influence and support donors and policy makers and to generate demand for good governance and accountability.

The network’s current priority areas include aid and domestic accountability, human rights, anti-corruption, governance assessments, and taxation. Each priority area has its own task team and goals.

In the area of anticorruption, the network brings together relevant members to better support the fight against corruption in developing countries through coordinated and coherent approaches, including the support in implementing UNCAC. (OECD “The OECD-DAC” n.d.)

#### *The Global Forum for Media Development*

The Global Forum for Media Development is a global policy network that aims to make media development an integral part of development. The forum holds that media is necessary for democratic development, good governance, and overall better development results. Specifically, the network believes that “free, independent, viable and inclusive media are prerequisites for creating and strengthening democratic society and human development” (GFMD 2008a). While policy makers and donors are well aware of the important role the media play in democratic development, media development is not yet recognized as a sector (GFMD 2008b). Thus, the support from a global network is critical.

Run by a global steering committee with representatives from all regions, the network focuses on several areas. First of all, it brings together actors and provides a platform for its members to discuss and exchange ideas and to share good practice about media development in the field. The network also advocates for and disseminates research on the impact of media development on governance and development; and it educates its members, policy makers, and the broader public about the importance of a free, independent, and plural press. The network also establishes norms for media development and encourages cross-sector collaboration. (GFMD 2008a)

Currently, the Global Forum for Media Development includes some 500 media development organizations that operate around the world. The network is voluntary and offers two types of membership: (1) general membership for individuals, nonprofit organizations, and NGOs working primarily on media development; and (2) associate membership for institutions and the private sector that provides

financial assistance and support to media development organizations or projects (GFMD 2008c).

### **Transnational Advocacy by Nonstate Actors**

Nonstate actors as norm entrepreneurs play a crucial role in creating and strengthening global norms and monitoring implementation. Because they lack political and economic authority, their influence on policy making is often based on “the use of information, persuasion, and moral pressure to contribute to change in international institutions and governments” (Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002, 11). Through collective action, nonstate actors such as civil society organizations, research organizations, foundations, and the media have been effective in pushing issues onto the global agenda and influencing policy through independent campaigns. Keck and Sikkink (1998) identify five stages in which nonstate actors are influential: “(1) issue creation and agenda setting; (2) influence on discursive positions of states and international organizations; (3) influence on institutional procedures; (4) influence on policy change in ‘target actors’ which may be states, international organizations like the World Bank, or private actors...; (5) influence on state behavior” (p. 25). The authors point out that “meaningful policy change” is more likely to occur when the first three stages of influence have occurred.

There are three different types of transnational collective action: (1) transnational advocacy networks—informal networks primarily focusing on information exchange, (2) transnational coalitions—formal networks emphasizing coordination of strategies and tactics (transnational campaigns) to influence social change, and (3) transnational social movements—sets of actors who mobilize at a global level for collective action through protest and disruptive activities (Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002). All three types involve primarily nonstate actors who work across borders for a common cause through the exchange of information and action (Keck and Sikkink 1998). However, as they seek to influence other actors in the global sphere, they may also seek ad hoc partnerships with them for

strengthened advocacy and influence; the essence of the organization/network, however, remains nonstate. Transnational nonstate actors may also participate in other norm-forming initiatives, such as multistakeholder initiatives and global policy networks; they may also face challenges similar to these in terms of legitimacy and representation, which span a broad range of actors with different backgrounds (Gaventa and Mayo 2009).

Persuasion, pressure, lobbying, and shaming are commonly used tactics in transnational advocacy. Keck and Sikkink (1998) categorize these efforts as follows:

1. *Information politics*—Nonstate actors are influential in providing alternative sources of information. The flow of information through networks generates facts and testimony used to persuade and stimulate people to act. Credibility is essential, and the use of testimony is effective if presented in a timely and dramatic fashion.
2. *Symbolic politics*—Nonstate actors make use of symbolic events in framing and advocating issues through compelling explanations.
3. *Leverage politics*—Nonstate actors use their ability to involve powerful actors to influence in an area in which network members are less likely to be influential.
4. *Accountability politics*—Nonstate actors hold public officials accountable for previously stated norms and commitments (such as treaties and declarations). Publicizing “norm-breaking” behavior has been deemed effective in making public officials conform to norms. These politics are also referred to as a “mobilization of shame” (Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002).

The transnational antislavery campaign, for example, relied heavily on information politics, using testimonials and reporting facts to promote change. A network was formed among British and American antislavery groups to exchange information, tactics, research, and language. The most

common tactics employed were petition, boycotts, and the use of eminent speakers traveling across the Atlantic Ocean. The network was used as a platform to diffuse tactics and collective action not only for the antislavery campaigns, but also for other social movements (such as the women's rights movement). Although the American and British campaigns worked under very different circumstances, they inspired each other through the sharing of information. (Keck and Sikkink 1998)

Transnational advocacy efforts may involve a mixture of one or many of the different forms of "politics," depending on the issue and the stage of the campaign process. The following examples of successful global campaigns demonstrate the influential role nonstate actors can play in creating and advocating for new norms and strategies that have brought their issues to the attention of the international community.

#### *Publish What You Pay*

Publish What You Pay (PWYP) launched in 2002 with the aim "to tackle the 'resource curse' by campaigning for greater transparency and accountability in the management of revenues from the oil, gas and mining industries" (van Oranje and Parham 2009, 15). This global network of civil society organizations was instrumental in creating the EITI by pressuring the U.K. government to take action and making sure that the participation of civil society organizations would be a main component of the EITI, carrying equal weight with other stakeholders. Since the coalition launched, the PWYP has had great impact in the following areas: (1) putting the issue of resource "revenue transparency" on the global agenda, (2) holding EITI stakeholders accountable for commitments to implementation, and (3) helping citizens gain better access to information needed to hold their governments accountable (van Oranje and Parham 2009). Moreover, the coalition has been successful in making revenue transparency an accepted norm among corporations. Although complete transparency of payments is yet to be achieved, the issue is no longer up for debate. A

more recent accomplishment includes the PWYP's advocacy efforts that led to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, a U.S. law signed in 2010 that requires all U.S.-registered companies working in the extractive industries to publish payments they make to governments around the world. The PWYP is now campaigning for strict implementation of the law, expanding coverage to a broader set of companies, and influencing other countries to follow (PWYP 2010).

Van Oranje and Parham (2009) point out several factors contributing to the success of the PWYP. First of all, the coalition's message is simple, but powerful: "The citizens of countries that are rich in natural resources should not be poor" (p. 16). Also, the PWYP's clear objectives have resonated well with both the international community and civil society organizations on the ground. They were quick to mobilize and become members of the campaign. Furthermore, the PWYP has positioned itself as an equal partner to governments and international organizations. Second, the organizational structure has allowed the coalition to deliver results effectively by using the expertise from a diverse set of members. Third, minimal bureaucracy has allowed coalition members on the ground to take ownership and tailor campaigns to the domestic context. It should be pointed out that the PWYP has members from almost 60 countries and has national affiliated coalitions in half of those countries (PWYP 2011). Membership is restricted to civil society and NGOs.

External circumstances have also contributed to the PWYP's success as good governance and accountability became priorities for many international institutions in the late 1990s. Van Oranje and Parham (2009) also point out that the media have played a major role in setting the issue on the global agenda. They were especially significant early on in the campaign process, bringing attention to transparency in the extractive industries when the EITI and the PWYP were launched. And they have continued to publish articles and report on research. To attract the media's attention, the PWYP has relied

greatly on members' individual communication departments.

Although the PWYP's loose and informal structure has been beneficial in many ways, it has also contributed to internal disputes, competition for power, and democratic deficit in terms of including developing countries in decision making. The broad membership has also brought challenges, such as language barriers, uneven access to technology, and lack of resources. Finally, the PWYP coalition has been criticized for being elitist by involving only a few powerful NGOs and not enough grassroots organizations. (van Oranje and Parham 2009)

#### *International Campaign to Ban Landmines*

Similarities can be drawn from the ICBL's campaign tactics that have been carefully studied and applied to other human rights campaigns around the world. The ICBL was launched in 1992 by six NGOs who had all witnessed the horrific effects of land mines (ICBL 2009). Based on an analysis by Hubert (2000) and others, the ICBL (ICBL "Inspiration" n.d.) draws attention to four contributing factors that lead up to the signing of the landmines treaty and implementation. First of all, the campaign had a clear message and goal to promote a total ban of antipersonnel mines. To change policy makers' perceptions and raise public awareness about the magnitude of landmines, the campaign reframed the issue from one of disarmament to humanitarian terms. Strong visual images from the ground were presented at targeted events to support their claims, which also provoked attention in the global media. The core members of the coalition were all experts with practical experience on the ground and in different sectors, which contributed further to the credibility of the evidence presented and to the campaign overall. The campaign also engaged compelling spokespeople, including those who had directly been affected by landmines and who would be difficult for decision makers to ignore. Also, although not mentioned in the analysis, the late Princess Diana of Wales played a crucial role in raising global attention to the cause. Second, the

internal campaign structure and processes were nonbureaucratic, and the strategy was flexible. The structure of the campaign committee, which set objectives and provided strategic directions, was informal and loosely organized and it operated with an informal budget. While Hubert (2000) points out the difficulty in assessing the impact this had on the success of the campaign, it is clear that the flexibility of the campaign strategy was crucial. Throughout the campaign process, strategies were adapted to respond to internal and external influences. Third, broad-based coalitions were formed among and between NGOs, international organizations, and governments. The partnerships established with several crucial governments contributed to the legitimacy of the campaign and were deemed crucial in the campaign's lobbying efforts. Hubert (2000) points out that "strategic coordination among like-minded governments is ultimately the decisive factor to reach new agreements" (p. 61). He further states that "if governmental coalitions are the key to the successful conclusion of humanitarian campaigns, NGO coalitions are the key to their emergence and development" (p. 62). Fourth, success was also based on external circumstances that played in favor of the campaign, such as the ending of the Cold War that drew attention in the international community to the reconstruction of conflict-torn societies. Also, the ICBL highlights the fact that negotiations of the treaty were held outside the United Nations organizations (which allowed for voting rather than consensual procedures) and NGOs acting as formal participants.

#### *Transparency International*

TI has also been effective in spearheading a global movement by relying a great deal on leverage politics (involving powerful actors). Peter Eigen, the founder of TI, built support to fight corruption not only by partnering with friends, NGOs, and international organizations; but also by gauging support from African leadership, including President Nelson Mandela of South Africa. As noted with other global campaigns, the ability to garner support from well-recognized leaders lends credibility and often

advances the cause. What was crucial for TI was the support solicited from high-level personalities in developing countries beginning early in the campaign process; it helped not to impose Western norms.

The media also played a major role in putting corruption on the global agenda. Global media coverage of TI's efforts was secured early on to promote the anticorruption message. The coalition also gained momentum through targeted events. While the initial focus was on large-scale business and government corruption at a global level, the campaign broadened its focus to include petty corruption upon request from leaders and activists in Latin America. This turned out to be a wise decision because it helped put corruption on the agenda at the First Summit of the Americas in 1994 and resulted in the establishment of several Latin American chapters of TI. Moreover, this helped advance the cause on the global agenda. (Eigen 2003)

In terms of accomplishments, TI has been effective in putting corruption on the global and national agendas through its domestic chapters. Because of their efforts, major institutions are now taking corruption seriously; and it is fully integrated into the development agenda as a major obstacle to development effectiveness. Moreover, TI played a crucial role in forming two major anticorruption conventions, UNCAC and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. Additionally, it has been effective in changing norms about corruption in public life, with more and more citizens recognizing corrupt behavior (TI "Accomplishments" n.d.)

### **Lessons Learned: Global Norms and Global Agenda Setting**

In terms of strategies and challenges, commonalities can be drawn among the initiatives discussed in this section. Strategies deemed effective in building political and public awareness at the global level include: (1) providing a strong evidence base for the norm; (2) framing and creating clear and simple messages; (3) using the global media; (4) building

coalitions among and between governments, international organizations, and NGOs; (5) leveraging high-profile events; (6) enlisting prominent spokespeople; (7) building trust; and (8) seizing external opportunities that can play in favor of the campaign and adapting strategies accordingly.

For norms to become part of the global agenda and maintain priority, campaigns must secure long-term political will and resources to sustain them. Moreover, campaigns should address internal challenges that stem from diverse memberships, such as consensus building, legitimacy, leadership, accountability, balanced representation, and trust. Establishing transparent procedures is crucial because lacking them may impact the quality of norms created. But these processes are difficult to implement in practice. Although strong backing from the international community lends awareness, legitimacy, drivers, and their motives can pose a challenge. Thus, initiatives should seek independence once they have a prominent voice in the global sphere and can be sustained.

In the end, signing a convention or agreeing to a global norm does not necessarily lead to change on the ground. The following section will specifically address how global norms diffuse to domestic contexts.

## **Regional and Domestic Agenda Setting**

National policy making and agenda setting are greatly influenced by international organizations, transnational networks, and coalitions. Majone (2006) points out that international organizations are not only concerned with influencing issues on the national agenda, but also with changing priorities on the decision-making agenda. He also suggests that economic and political interdependence influences the substance and procedures of agenda setting and national policy making. If national leaders are more aware of the impact their decisions have at the global level, they may be more open to

international cooperation and ideas coming from international and civil society organizations in shaping the national agenda and/or alternatives for action. As Khagram (2004) points out, “Rapid changes in state policies and institutions often, and increasingly, reflect processes of conformity to globally spreading transnational norms of development rather than the diversity of forms and more gradual shifts expected from variations in domestic structures, interactions and processes” (p. 15).

Transnational networks and coalitions play a crucial role in advocating for global norms to become institutionalized processes and structures in regional and domestic contexts. True and Mintrom’s analysis (2001), for example, shows that transnational networks have been the driving forces behind the diffusion of gender mainstreaming and are making a great impact on domestic politics and policies. Also, Khagram (2004) says that the more states interact with transnational actors, the more likely they are to integrate global norms into their institutions. Transnational networks and coalitions have the ability to provide a link between global norms and national contexts and to play a crucial role in empowering nonstate actors to hold public officials accountable to commitments made at the global level. Their role can be seen as threefold: (1) advocate for the adoption of global norms, (2) hold state leaders accountable to institutionalize norms they have agreed to, and (3) monitor implementation of norms.

Many international campaigns, however, have been criticized for the lack of domestic representation and for “relying heavily on international solutions to problems that are national in nature, and thereby shifting the authority of national policy decision-making into the international arena” (Pitt, Loehr, and Malviya 2005, 11). For lasting success, domestic actors are crucial in providing information from a bottom-up perspective that will strengthen and inform strategies in transnational and domestic advocacy efforts. Domestic civil society organizations should be seen as an important ally in pressuring leaders to adopt global norms. A

contributing factor to the success of the Global Campaign for Education, for example, was its strong connection to local reality and close allies on the ground (Gaventa and Mayo 2009). Also, the close ties between the ICBL and the domestic campaigns were crucial for a consistent and well-coordinated campaign model (Hubert 2000). Moreover, the PWYP’s domestic coalition members are the foundation of the campaign’s achievements. While they are working toward the same policy and advocacy goals as the global campaign, they operate as independent entities and adapt strategies to reflect domestic issues and priorities (van Oranje and Parham 2009).

Advocacy alone, however, is not enough. Khagram (2004) suggests that the presence of democratic institutions or some degree of democratization is a must for global norms to become institutionalized practices because these factors “condition the broader impacts of growing transnational contentious politics and spreading global norms on the political economy of development” (p. 20). For example, True and Mintrom (2001) found that adopting gender-mainstreaming institutions was associated with democratic ideals or countries in transition. Their analysis concludes that “when the political structures of nation-states are open to new voices and new ideas and when people sympathetic to those voices and ideas actually hold important decision-making power, then compelling advocacy on the part of nonstate actors can result in the rapid diffusion of ideas for policy innovation” (p. 51). While the level of democracy can be a crucial factor for a successful diffusion, global norms could actually also lead to democratic ideals.

When local channels between nonstate actors and governments are blocked, the use of boomerang strategies can be effective. Keck and Sikkink (1998) explain that a boomerang pattern occurs when “domestic NGOs bypass their state and directly search out international allies to try to bring pressure on their states from outside” (p. 13). International pressure may actually improve the quality of national agenda setting (Majone 2006). Keck

and Sikkink (1998) further discuss the benefits and importance of the global/domestic links from both sides. For domestic NGOs, international allies “provide access, leverage, and information (and often money) they could not expect to have on their own; for northern groups, they make credible the assertion that they are struggling with, and not only for, their southern partners” (pp. 12–13).

One reason why state leaders may not conform to global norms is simply that they are not considered relevant to the domestic context; at the same time, however, leaders want to gain credibility in the international community. Collier (2007) states that the majority of norms reflect behaviors desired in developed nations or emerging market economies, but developing countries need rules that are appropriate to their contexts. Considering the interconnected world we live in, however, this may well depend on the issue. Peters, Koechlin, and Zinkernagel (2009) point out that policy issues are becoming increasingly globalized and can no longer be tackled by states on their own or through national standard setting.

Stevenson (2010) provides a useful analysis on the process of norm diffusion in global climate change. She states that global norms are fluid and open to reinterpretation; as they diffuse through the system, the original focus usually gets lost. For a global norm to successfully diffuse there must be a match between domestic and international structures. Stevenson implies that the way local actors interpret norms is dependent on their ability to “build congruence between a foreign idea and their local practices and beliefs through ‘framing’ or ‘grafting’” (p. 9). Framing refers to the way a norm is communicated to make sense to local reality. Grafting, on the other hand, is the tactic by which a norm is associated “with a pre-existing norm in the same issue area, which makes a similar prohibition or injunction” (Acharya 2004, 244). No matter which process is used, global norms will not necessarily be interpreted in its original form but rather in some adapted fashion.

Stevenson (2010) points out several limitations to these processes. She says that “while the mecha-

nisms of framing and grafting may have enabled actors to align themselves with global norms, they have proven entirely inadequate for triggering the radical shifts needed to advance long-term sustainability” (p. 14). In terms of global climate change, she asserts that congruence-building mechanisms of framing and grafting have barely been absorbed into domestic structures because these processes “rely on a limited number of elite actors with an evidently limited capacity for consequential innovative reasoning” (p. 15). Stevenson also points out that the short electoral cycles in liberal democratic systems can be an obstacle for radical shifts to occur. As an alternative approach, she proposes the use of public deliberation because it would allow for a broader set of actors to engage in the norm diffusion process—a practice that could also play a crucial factor in sustainability. A main challenge, however, is feeding ideas from public deliberation into policy-making processes.

With these points in mind, let us revisit some of the initiatives discussed previously—specifically, what strategies have been effective in diffusing the norms they advocate as well as challenges they are facing.

### **Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative**

To date, 24 countries have achieved “candidate status” of the EITI—that is, they have met the four sign-up indicators; and 11 countries have reached compliant status, with 6 countries achieving this status in 2011 (EITI 2009b). The EITI’s validation standards include a wide range of norms: transparent accounting, government accountability, and extractive industry disclosure, among others. Before a country can embark on this process, it must have cooperation from civil society, multinational extractive industry companies, and the government at the national and municipal levels; and it must form multistakeholder initiatives among these parties to oversee implementation.

While the low compliance rate may result in part from a rigorous validation process, the complexity of the issue should not be ignored. Accord-

ing to Darby (2008), “in most countries few people understand the taxation or royalties system; few people understand how oil, gas, and mining companies operate; governments and companies often have a very imperfect understanding of what people want; and virtually no one understands all these issues” (p. 13). Communicating the importance of transparency to all stakeholders involved is critical. If the citizenry does not appreciate the ramifications of opaque transactions because they are not exposed to a relatable message, it will be difficult to mobilize their support. For example, the EITI in Kazakhstan has not gained traction because of ineffective communication. The country’s communication campaign focused its efforts in Astana and Almaty (the capital city and the center of commerce, respectively); they did not create strategies for the industrial areas outside the urban centers nor did they translate communication materials to the Kazakh language. It is not surprising that survey results found that the public had vastly diverse understandings of the EITI because of the accessibility of messaging (Darby 2008). That said, the EITI has a strong communication component and encourages those involved in the planning of communication activities to customize their approach to the specific environment.

The Liberian EITI (LEITI), on the other hand, has emerged as an example of a successful campaign. In 2009, Liberia was the first nation in Africa to become EITI compliant, and it had been in the process of implementing the initiative since 2006 (EITI 2010a). LEITI has overcome obstacles impeding transparency through a series of actions that led to the LEITI Act in July 2009. The act requires all extractive industry enterprises and government agencies operating in Liberia to report and publish all payments for licenses and operating contracts. If a company does not comply, it is subject to criminal proceedings. (EITI 2009a)

The success of the LEITI has greatly contributed to the leadership of President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, who has strong support from Liberians and the international community. Leading up to the

LEITI, the president centered her platform on national growth, poverty reduction, and the fight against corruption. She continues to effectively tie the LEITI Act to her platform by focusing on building trust among communities and engaging in a national dialogue about the country’s resources. With the president’s support of the LEITI and her understanding of the important role of communication, the initiative has been able to engage a multitude of stakeholders about the results in Liberia’s first EITI report. The results were communicated through several channels, including newspaper, radio programming, and street theater that generated a great deal of public interest in the subject.

While presidential leadership has been important in Liberia, Azerbaijan has taken a more grassroots approach to the EITI. In this emerging economy, oil is the main source of income. The current democratic governance system is relatively young; the public sector is still being developed; and there is civic pressure for access to information. The success of the EITI in Azerbaijan is based on the several coalitions formed by nonstate actors to support and advocate for transparency. For example, the Transparency of Oil Revenues and Public Finance Program is a coalition that links transparency to concrete improvements for people through research, advocacy, and capacity building (Revenue Watch 2010). Furthermore, several networks exist: for example, the Civic Response Network that focuses on increasing community involvement and dialogue with the government in the regions directly affected by oil extraction; and the Investigative Journalist Network and Access 2 Information that builds capacity, monitors resources, and has drawn public attention to challenges in the EITI monitoring process. (OSIAF 2007)

In addition to efforts by these coalitions, national agenda setting is also likely to be influenced by the Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, a coalition involving national governments from more than 20 countries in the region (including Azerbaijan), OECD governments, civil society organizations, the private sector, and

international organizations. The network's main objective is to support countries in their fight against corruption by providing a platform for members to exchange information, promote anticorruption activities, and coordinate donor activities. (OECD "Anti-Corruption" n.d.)

### **Transparency International**

TI has been effective in establishing strong domestic ties through some 90 national chapters that "bring together relevant players from government, civil society, business and the media to promote transparency in elections, in public administration, in procurement and in business," and "use advocacy campaigns to lobby governments to implement anti-corruption reforms" (TI n.d.). The coalition also organizes at a regional level. It was instrumental in the advocacy efforts around the implementation and enforcement of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, which includes norms to eliminate corruption in the region. After the convention was signed in 1996, TI's network in Latin America was established and came to play a crucial role in raising awareness about the convention, contributing to the ratification, developing an official monitoring mechanism, and advocating that civil society organizations take part in the monitoring and complex policy processes. They were also effective in building capacity of civil society organizations and creating advocacy tools to strengthen domestic and regional anticorruption campaigns. TI's accomplishments in Latin America were based on several factors: effective regional coordination, assistance from the TI secretariat, nurturing "political sensitivity," and creating new communication channels transnationally and with local governments. (Selwood and Weyrauch 2007)

TI has also been effective in putting corruption on the domestic agenda in Pakistan. In 2002, TI-Pakistan and other anticorruption organizations felt that the National Accountability Bureau, an arm of the Pakistani government, was not sufficient to handle the many facets of corruption, a deeply entrenched social norm. In collaboration with

more than 50 stakeholders, TI-Pakistan produced a national anticorruption strategy report detailing causes and impacts of corruption and a set of recommendations to combat the problem. As a result, the National Anti-Corruption Strategy Project was formed, funded by Pakistan's government and the U.K. Department of International Development. The project had two phases: diagnostic development and strategy development. Soliciting input from more than 3,000 stakeholders, the project found that procurement was a major area of corruption in the public sector. The strategy report, produced in the second part of the project, entails major issue areas and norms to guide the country's future vision in combating corruption—the need for political will, accountability, independent and free media, and integrity pacts (a norm in which parties of a business transaction promise not to offer or accept a bribe). Overall, the National Anti-Corruption Strategy Project has created a strong emphasis on the part of the Pakistani government to making reforms that will increase transparency and reduce corruption. (TI 2003)

The case of Pakistan demonstrates the effectiveness of TI in bringing together the relevant stakeholders to effect change on the ground. As in the case of the landmine campaign, a civil society organization came to play a critical role in the emergence of government coalitions.

### **Lessons Learned: Regional and Domestic Agenda Setting**

For global norms to successfully diffuse, cooperation among multiple stakeholders extends from the global level to regional and domestic levels. To effect change, advocacy campaigns should secure long-term political will and public support. Transnational networks and campaign coalitions can play a crucial role in advocating and monitoring the domestic norm diffusion process, building strong relationships and capacity of local actors, holding public officials accountable, and adapting global advocacy strategies and tools to accommodate domestic environments. Framing of norms is critical at this level because the norm

must be communicated in a way that makes sense to a domestic audience. Furthermore, to make an impact, advocacy campaigns should develop flexible strategies that accommodate environmental changes.

No matter through which route a norm is established, it will not be implemented unless domestic challenges are overcome. The following section will discuss these challenges in more detail, as well as possible strategies and tools to overcome these.

## Implementation Challenges and Strategies

In reviewing different initiatives for this report, there is a great deal of emphasis put into raising awareness of norms at the global level—mainly to secure and maintain political will. Clearly, in today’s rapidly changing environment, issues and norms compete for attention, priority, and resources to sustain them on the global agenda. However, norms agreed to at the global level will not necessarily lead to transformational change on the ground. Thus, global advocacy campaigns must also integrate strategies for implementation and monitoring and must hold leaders accountable for the global norms to which they agreed. If we look at the previous cases discussed, very few global campaigns have actually led to transformational change. For example, EITI’s progress in implementation has been slow. While more countries have recently attained candidate status, and the publishing of financial information from the extractive industries is spreading, only Liberia and Nigeria have signed the EITI into law.

Although TI has done a tremendous job in putting corruption (a previously taboo subject) on the global agenda, the 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index shows a rather bleak picture of corruption around the world. With more than half of the 178 indexed countries scoring below 5 on a 10-point scale (10 being “very clean”), corruption remains a major impediment to development (TI 2010). Consequently, TI has switched its focus and is now advocating for stricter implementation and moni-

toring of UNCAC. Although both the EITI and TI have a strong presence in many countries and are raising awareness, this is clearly not enough. Obstacles on the ground often hinder implementation and must therefore be tackled and integrated into global advocacy campaigns.

In Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm life cycle, “internalization” is the final stage—one in which a norm attains a “taken-for-granted” quality and is no longer part of public discourse. According to the authors, norms reaching this stage are usually not controversial or at the center of domestic politics. As we know, the contrary position usually applies in development and, specifically, in governance reform. The issues dealt with are complex, and countries are dealing with different contextual challenges. This leads us to the following questions: What are the exact challenges to governance reform? What tools can be used to overcome these challenges? What are the lessons for future advocacy campaigns?

### Key Challenges to Implementation

Odugbemi and Jacobson (2008) identify five key challenges that have proved to impede the success of governance reform efforts across countries and sectors: (1) securing political will and identifying best approaches for reaching out to decision makers, (2) gaining support of public sector middle-managers who often are the strongest opponents of change, (3) building broad coalitions with influential actors favoring change and tackling powerful vested interests, (4) transforming indifferent or hostile public opinion into support for reform efforts, and (5) instigating citizen demand for accountability to sustain governance reform.

These challenges resonate with several of the campaigns reviewed in this report. A major challenge for the PWYP coalition, for example, is overcoming vested interests among governments and companies. Also, the coalition constantly faces the challenge of keeping transparency a priority on both the domestic and business agendas (van Oranje and Parham 2009). Securing political will is also a chal-

lenge for the landmine campaign because many signatories of the landmines treaty have yet to fulfill their obligations and/or sign up to the treaty. Political will is also a challenge for the EITI. Although more countries are expected to reach compliant status in the near future, a challenge is to keep countries committed to the EITI's rigorous and long-term validation process that continues well beyond compliant status.

The political economy environment is fluid and continuously changing. Thus, to make an impact, campaigns must stay abreast of changes and adjust strategies accordingly. Pitt, Loehr, and Malviya (2005) point out that although campaigns are usually successful in influencing the national agenda, they also need to form effective strategies to encourage implementation and monitoring. To mobilize political will that aims to change policies and ensure implementation, the authors provide five crucial factors for consideration:

1. *Political context*—An assessment of the political environment should be made in advance. To have maximum impact, campaigners should look for points of entry and adapt to a continuously changing environment.
2. *Complexity of policy processes*—Campaigns should take the complexity of policy making into consideration when planning campaigns and ensure that strategies address the different stages of the process.
3. *Relevant and credible evidence*—Evidence can have a great influence on the policy process and can strengthen arguments for reform. Pitt, Loehr, and Malviya (2005) point out that “both research-based evidence and policy-advocacy research can be relevant and credible, but need to be utilized appropriately depending on the crux of the campaign and assessed at an early stage” (p. 24).
4. *Effective communication of evidence*—How evidence is presented and communicated is essential to the success of a campaign. Messages should be carefully tailored for each audience. As the authors suggest, the “general public is

more responsive to easily understood messages with a strong political angle, whilst politicians are more responsive to technical solution-oriented reports” (p. 24).

5. *Networks*—As previously discussed, networks can play a crucial role in the norm diffusion process, strengthen advocacy, and increase the campaign's legitimacy at a national and global level by feeding information upstream. Pitt, Loehr, and Malviya (2005) say that “links with influential individuals can help to ‘open windows’ or increase a campaign's profile” (p. 8). Moreover, networks can play a crucial role in the assessment of the political economy environment and can inform domestic strategies accordingly. Also, in the event that communication channels between the public and the government are closed, the boomerang effect with external network members putting pressure on the state can be used.

As noted, these recommendations are similar and relevant to the findings of this report. The underlying principle for any campaign to succeed is a solid understanding of challenges in the domestic political economy environment. Following is a closer review of elements crucial for campaigns to succeed, and why they are important.

### Using Political Economy Analysis

Political economy analysis can help identify domestic environment opportunities and threats to governance reform; it can also provide alternative solutions (Fritz, Kaiser, Levy 2009). Based on such analysis, reform advocates and campaigners can develop new approaches for action and use political economy as a basis to build public and political support for the norms they are advocating.

There are several approaches to political economy analysis. A problem-driven approach, for example, focuses on particular challenges or opportunities to reform. It entails three levels: (1) identify the problem, opportunity, or vulnerability to be tackled; (2) carve out weaknesses in institutional and

governance structures; and (3) identify political economy drivers impeding change or entry point for change (Fritz, Kaiser, and Levy 2009). Another political economy approach is the journalistic inquiry-based model. This bottom-up approach to political economy analysis gathers information through preliminary research and interviews with local actors who informally discuss the views of the government and challenges to reform. Inquiries include areas such as understanding of the overall political environment, identifying key stakeholders and vested interests, determining the role of civil society, and assessing the media environment. (Lal 2008)

A sound analysis of the political economy environment is critical in tackling implementation challenges to reform. Campaigns can use information gathered from political economy analysis to better position the cause or norm and can coordinate strategies and tactics accordingly. To influence policy, internal and external strategies should be flexible enough to accommodate changes in the political economy environment. Thus, assessment of the environment should not only be conducted in the pre-planning stage, but throughout the campaign process.

### **Understanding the Complexity of Policy Making**

For norms to successfully take root, campaigners ought to understand the complexity of the policy-making process. The multiple streams framework is one of several frameworks that illustrate this complexity and possible entry points for influence.

Policies in the multiple streams framework “are made by national governments under conditions of ambiguity,” in which ambiguity is referred to as “a state of having many ways of thinking about the same circumstances or phenomena” (Zahariadis 2007, 66). The framework identifies three independent streams, each with its own dynamics: problems, policies, and politics. The *problems* stream involves concerns that arise through different indicators and events from both inside and outside the government. The problem is defined in the *policies* stream through a set of competing ideas/solutions gener-

ated by policy networks that are discussed and debated. Whether the problem will be given prominence and priority on the decision-making agenda is determined in the *politics* stream. It depends on several factors: public opinion, pressure-group campaigns, and administrative or legislative turnover. When the three streams intersect, a narrow policy window emerges in which a policy has the opportunity to be adopted. (Zahariadis 2007)

Norm entrepreneurs can play an important role in influencing the different streams by bringing awareness to specific problems, taking part in problem definition, promoting solutions, generating research and evidence to support a specific policy, and mobilizing public opinion. Several of the global policy networks and multistakeholder initiatives (previously discussed) operate and are influential on policy making at the national level.

The EITI and the PWYP, for example, were crucial partners in the work that led to the signing of the LEITI Act in 2009. The campaign benefited greatly from political buy-in early in the process with President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf’s strong commitment to fight corruption from the moment she took office in 2006, her ability to communicate the complexity of corruption to multiple stakeholders, and her capacity to get them engaged in the process. There was also an opportunity to tackle the corruption problem after the country’s civil war. Nevertheless, domestic challenges and dynamics in the three streams—problems, policies, and politics—had to be tackled to get the bill signed into law. Today, the EITI and PWYP continue to play an active role in overseeing implementation and monitoring in Liberia.

### **Building Effective Coalitions**

Building effective coalitions is another crucial aspect that has proved essential in producing transformational change. One of the ultimate success factors of Britain’s antislavery campaign, for example, was based on the effective coalitions formed with the Quakers. These coalitions founded the mass campaign to abolish slave trade (Krzmaric 2007). Also, the international women’s movement would have

faced difficulty in influencing policy were it not for the broad-based coalitions formed (Chen 1995). In the landmines case, the coalitions built between and among NGOs and governments were essential for the campaign's success.

Coalitions are defined as “collaborative, means-oriented arrangements that permit distinct organizational entities to pool resources in order to effect change” (Tarrow 2006, 164). Tarrow points out that coalitions are frequently formed to address short-term threats and opportunities; they continue only when these persist. He identifies five crucial factors to build effective coalitions:

1. *framing*—coalition members' ability to find a common approach to framing issues;
2. *trust*—an environment in which members can rely on one another;
3. *credible commitments*—each member's ability to stay committed, which may depend on resources and changes in his or her domestic environment;
4. *management of difference*—the coalitions' ability to resolve tensions among members in reaching consensus on goals, tactics, and structure; and,
5. *selective incentives*—motivational factors prompting for members to cooperate, such as joint political influence (p. 165).

Building effective and sustainable coalitions is challenging; and when it involves transnational actors, the challenge may become even more cumbersome because of cultural and language differences. To avoid a coalition breakdown, Pitt, Loehr, and Malviya (2005) recommend that clear objectives and terms of the coalition be made at the beginning, that priorities be negotiated and addressed among coalition members, and that who is accountable to whom be decided.

Tarrow (2006) identifies *campaign coalitions* as the most effective strategy for transnational collaboration. Characteristics of these include high involvement, long-term commitment, policy issue specific, flexibility in responding to a changing environment, and their ability to adjust tactics ac-

ordingly. To effect change, transnational coalitions must forge strong ties with change agents at the domestic level. Keck and Sikkink (1998) stress that “foreign and international actors alone rarely succeed in changing embedded practices because they do not understand how to frame debates in convincing and accessible ways for the domestic audience” (p. 66). Moreover, involving influential leaders is crucial for reasons of coalition legitimacy and credibility to tackle powerful vested interests.

In dealing with opposition, which can lead to counterreform or blocking coalitions, consensus building can be an effective approach in which “parties seek to make mutually advantageous trades—offering their “votes” in exchange for a modification of what is being proposed or for a promise of support on other issues” (Susskind 2006, 269). While dialogue is important to increase understanding about an issue and respect for different viewpoints, it will not necessarily lead to policy change. Instead, Susskind argues that “carefully structured consensus building efforts can produce fairer, more efficient, wiser and more stable results . . .” (p. 270). Furthermore, it maximizes the value of the agreement to all parties involved, leaves everyone in a better position to handle future agreements, reduces transaction costs, and increases credibility and trust among the public (Susskind 2006).

The use of threats has proved to be less effective because it undermines legitimacy and can foster blocking coalitions. Susskind (2006) points out that governments can strengthen their legitimacy and reduce long-term costs by engaging in collaborative and participatory approaches based on consensus building. Moreover, access to “good information” is crucial in producing collaborative efforts and to tackling tensions that arise among parties in the reform process (Varenik 2008).

### **Mobilizing Public Opinion**

In development, issues tend to default on technocratic solutions, not participation. Building public support and mobilizing public opinion, however, are critical for reforms to succeed. In Adam Hochschild's research on Britain's antislavery campaign,

mass mobilization to shift public opinion about slave trade was one of the key success factors to the abolishment of slavery (Krznaric 2007). The aim of the strategy was to make people question slave trade and bring the issue to the forefront of public discourse. To this effect, a horrific image from a slave ship was widely distributed and displayed in public places—an image that had a tremendous impact on the public who had long been far removed from the true facts about slavery. Moreover, instead of promoting unrest among slaves, the abolitionists focused on engaging the public and getting their support before lobbying parliament. In the landmines campaign, strong visual images from the ground were used to provoke attention in the global media and build public support.

The use of relevant and credible evidence is crucial in building both public and political support. Also, how evidence is communicated can be a determining factor. In this regard, Susskind (2006) suggests a few techniques that can be effective, including “cost-benefit analysis, risk assessment, and environmental impact assessment” (p. 275). Also, Varenik (2008) points out that data and analysis can strengthen the justification for reform and provide incentives in doing so. He suggests that advocates should focus on crafting different messages and ensuring that they are timely to gain support. The messenger is imperative to the success of the campaign. In the landmines case, for example, all coalition members were experts with practical experience from the ground contributing to the credibility of the evidence presented. Moreover, the campaign used compelling spokespeople, including those directly affected by landmines. High-level people and celebrities can also be effective in bringing attention to issues, such as the late Princess Diana’s devotion to ban landmines. The bottom line is that for any reform effort to succeed, campaigns must strive to get the public opinion on their side.

## Conclusions

For global norms to successfully diffuse, implementation and monitoring must be considered equally important to global agenda setting. The failure to not include these components in campaigns is often prompted by a lack of adequate strategies and/or resources. Raising awareness alone, however, is not sufficient to achieve transformational change. In governance reform, the implementation and enforcement of norms are possibly the most difficult part of the process because these must overcome challenges in the political economy environment and pass through complex policy-making processes. While there are common challenges to implementation, specific contextual challenges can be identified through political economy analysis, which will strengthen strategies for impact. Strategies must also be flexible enough to reflect an ever-changing political landscape and public opinion. The engagement with public officials and the public is an ongoing process.

Moreover, for global norms to transplant, long-term commitment as well as cooperation among a broad range of highly involved stakeholders is crucial. The responsibility and ownership of global norm diffusion ought to extend to the broader public, not be limited to a few elite actors. A strong backing from nonstate actors is necessary to drive change processes toward implementation, but nonstate actors are so often left out or not considered equal partners among other stakeholders. Domestic actors can play a crucial role in building support and mobilizing public opinion by carrying out credible and relevant campaigns based on sound analysis of the political economy environment. Besides, establishing partnerships with local actors can be crucial for monitoring implementation. To this end, global campaign coalitions ought to engage and empower domestic actors as equal partners in advocating for transformational change.

## Note

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